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Abstract 
This paper studies the relation between bank size and bank valuation. We use Tobin’s Q and market-to-
book ratio as measures of bank valuation, and another two variables—natural logarithm of total assets 
and natural logarithm of total operating income—as measures of bank size. Using a sample of publicly-
traded U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2014, we find a quadric relation between bank size 
and bank valuations. Bank valuations will rise and then fall as bank size increases. This finding holds in 
different sample periods: before, during, and after the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
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1. Introduction 
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, several famous banks, for instance, Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Stearns collapsed. Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. Later, its North American 
investment-banking and trading divisions along with its New York headquarters building were purchased 
by Barclays. And its franchise in the Asia Pacific region as well as its investment-banking and equities 
business in Europe and the Middle East were acquired by Nomura Holdings. Similarly, Merrill Lynch and 
Bear Stearns were taken over by Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase, respectively. It is surprising that 
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers had been the third and fourth largest investment bank in the US, 
respectively, behind Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. Bear Stearns was the seventh-largest 
securities firm in terms of total capital. Looking back into the past, Merrill Lynch was founded in 1914. 
After making several successful investments, Merrill Lynch became famous. It developed in the next 
several decades. Then, in 1941, Merrill Lynch, E. A. Pierce and Cassatt merged with Fenner & Beane. And 
later, in 1952, the company formed Merrill Lynch & Co. as a holding company. Merging other companies, 
Merrill Lynch continued to grow to become the third largest investment bank in the US in 2007. On the 
process of developing, the size of Merrill Lynch grew and its business lines expanded. The complex 
operation of Merrill Lynch included investment banking, equity and fixed-income sales and trading, 
research, investment management, private equity and private banking. This eventually contributed to 
annually increasing profits before the crisis. Things were similar in Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. 
Thus, this phenomenon raised our concerns about the effects of bank size on bank valuation. For 
example, what’s the impact of bank size on valuation? Does the impact change during financial crisis? To 
answer these questions, we regress bank valuation on bank size while control for other variables. 
 
In this paper, we empirically study the relation between bank size and bank valuation. Our sample 
contains annual observations on a large number of publicly-traded U.S. bank holding companies 
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(hereafter banks) from 2002 to 2014. We use Tobin’s Q as a measure of bank valuations (e.g. Laeven and 
Levine, 2007) and the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of bank size (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 
2007). 
 
We find a quadric relation between bank size and bank valuations. At the beginning, a positive relation 
exits between those two variables. However, as banks grow to some extent, bank valuations are 
inversely related to bank size. Therefore, bank valuations will rise and then fall as bank size increases. 
After controlling for various bank characteristics such as capital, loans, deposits and asset diversity, as 
well as time fixed effects, we find this relation holds true. The effect is economically large and 
statistically significant. 
 
Next, we run three separate regressions for the periods before, during, and after the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 to see whether the relation between bank size and bank valuations is stable under different 
market conditions. We find that increasing size causes higher valuations firstly and lower valuations 
secondly in each period. 
 
We use alternative measures of valuations and bank size. Market-to-book ratio (Caprio, Laeven and 
Levine, 2007) is used to replace Tobin’s Q to measure bank valuations. Natural logarithm of total 
operating income is used as another measure of bank size (Goetz, Laeven and Levine, 2013). Finally, we 
find the above-mentioned relation between bank size and bank valuations remain unchanged under 
different measurements.  
 
On the one hand, this paper relates to the literature that studies the relations between several bank-
specific characteristics and bank performance (e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2007; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; 
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Calomiris and Nissim 2014; Hovakimian, Armen and Kane 2000; and Goetz, Laeven and Levine 2013). On 
the other hand, we add to the literature that gives indirect support to our expectation of the relation 
between bank size and bank valuation (e.g. Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Stiroh, 2000; Huang and 
Ratnovski, 2011; Kashyap, Raghuram and Stein, 2002; Penas and Unal, 2004; Kashyap, Stein and Hanson, 
2010; Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; and Farhi and Tirole, 2012).  
 
Our paper contains five parts. The first part is the introduction shown as Section 1. Then, Section 2 
reviews some recent relevant literature and outlines some theoretical considerations. Section 3 
describes the sample data, independent and dependent variables as well as four control variables. 
Section 4 presents the main empirical results and tries to give a reasonable explanation to these results. 
Section 5 draws the conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
We expect a quadric relation between bank size and bank valuation. At the beginning, a positive relation 
exits between those two variables. However, as the banks grow to some extent, bank valuation is 
inversely related to bank size. Therefore, bank valuation will rise and then fall as bank size increases. 
According to the existing literature, there was no direct theory proving such a relation between bank 
size and bank valuation. Nevertheless, various studies provided us with the hints to this conjecture. 
Three reasons for assuming this relation between bank size and bank valuation will be discussed as 
followings.  
 
First, size is usually considered to have an effect on bank performance through economies of scale or 
scope (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997). As size increases, the average cost decreases. This is scale 
economies. Stiroh (2000) finds that the degree of scale economies is typically strong for large banks. We 
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could understand it from several perspectives. Suppliers are willing to trade with big retailers, customers 
are willing to shop in big stores. This is due to their trust on the strength of big companies. Similarly, 
with the increasing size, banks may find it easier to attract customers to open accounts and put money 
into accounts.  As a result, the sources of funding in big banks are stable and safe and their costs of 
funding are low. Furthermore, big banks could have lower information risks and higher stock liquidity. 
However, scale economies could have negative impact on bank valuation beyond an optimal bank size. 
At that time, bank wholesale funding could be a major source of vulnerability (Huang and Ratnovski, 
2011), which leads to low bank valuation. The debt of large banks could include more short-term 
funding than that of small banks. Consequently, large banks are more exposed to liquidity shocks and 
market failures such as liquidity shortages and fire sales (Kashyap, Raghuram and Stein, 2002). 
 
Second, banks could benefit from increased diversification (Penas and Unal, 2004). Structural 
transformations frequently happened in the financial intermediation industry over the past several 
decades. The organization of banks has become more complex as banks have expanded size. Then, 
banks have gone from engaging mostly in traditional commercial banking activities to engaging mostly in 
non-traditional activities such as investment banking and proprietary trading. Some products (e.g. 
mortgage backed securities, or MBS) that are related to non-traditional activities give banks exposure to 
allured profits. Big banks have greater abilities such as advanced operation system and excellent 
professional team to engage in non-traditional activities compared to small banks. Accordingly, some 
argument against the restrictions on risky bank activities like non-traditional activities is rational. It 
would distort the allocation of resources, hurting the efficiency of capital allocation and imposing 
substantial costs to the real economy (Kashyap, Stein and Hanson, 2010). It is no doubt that to some 
extent, engaging in non-traditional activities is a fortune for banks. However, the degree to which banks 
engage in non-traditional activities could not exceed an optimal value.  For example, Demirguç-Kunt and 
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Huizinga (2010) find that banks which rely to a larger extent on non-deposit funding and non-interest 
income are more profitable but also riskier. If the profits are not sufficient to compensate for the risks, 
revenue diversification generated along with size growth will reduce bank valuation.  
 
Third, we refer to the too-big-to-fail hypothesis (e.g., Farhi and Tirole, 2012). Large banks with more 
deposits are more likely to get low-cost and government-subsidized funding. Large banks have more 
advantages over small banks in acquiring and using such cheap funding. Conversely, if large banks 
excessively exploit such cheap funding to take on risks, their valuation may decrease. Although there 
might be the expectation of government bailouts given the regulators’ reluctance to close large banks, 
the reduction of bank valuation could be inevitable.  
 
3. Sample and variables 
3.1 Sample 
This paper uses a panel data set of publicly-traded banks in the U.S. from 2002 to 2014. From the 
Federal Reserve’s Y-9C reports, we obtain yearly accounting data for each listed bank. Then, we get 
stock data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Our sample consists of 4,529 
observations of the listed banks. As shown in table 1, during the initial four years, there were between 
438 and 454 banks each year. The number of banks dramatically declined to 376 in 2006 and kept 
declining at a low pace until 2014. This might be due to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
3.2 Variables 
We use two different ways to measure bank valuation: Tobin’s Q (Laeven and Levine, 2007) and market-
to-book ratio (Caprio, Laeven and Levine, 2007). We also use two different ways to measure the size of 
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banks: natural logarithm of total assets and natural logarithm of total operating income (Goetz, Laeven 
and Levine, 2013). In addition, we pick four control variables—capital, loans, deposit and asset 
diversity—to control for their effects on bank valuation. Furthermore, we control for common factors 
which influence the valuation of all banks in a given year.   
 
3.2.1 Measures of Bank Valuation  
In this paper, Tobin’s Q is one of the measures of bank valuation. Tobin’s Q is the sum of the market 
value of common equity, the book value of preferred shares and the book value of total debt divided by 
the book value of total assets. It specifically measures the present value of future cash flows divided by 
the replacement cost of tangible assets. Nevertheless, there are two weaknesses when using Tobin’s Q 
as the measure of bank valuation. One weakness is that banks usually have high leverage. The other 
weakness is that tangible assets of banks mostly are financial assets. Thus, we also use market-to-book 
ratio as alternative measure of bank valuation to confirm the relation between bank size and bank 
valuation. Market-to-book ratio is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Market 
value of equity is determined in the stock market. 
 
3.2.2 Measures of Bank Size  
We use natural logarithm of total assets and natural logarithm of total operating income to measure 
bank size. Natural logarithm of total assets is an asset-based measure. Total assets include loans, 
securities, investments and other assets. Natural logarithm of total operating income is an income-
based measure. Total operating income includes interest income and noninterest income (e.g., fee 
income, trading revenue and commission income). A specialized loan-making bank will have a large ratio 
of interest income to total operating income. Total operating income could capture the importance of 
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banks’ off-balance-sheet items. However, loans could also generate fee income, and thus the income-
based measure could overestimate the degree to which specialized loan-making banks engage in non-
lending activities. Although the asset-based measure suffers from less problems, we use both the asset-
based and the income-based measures of bank size to confirm the relation between bank size and bank 
valuation. 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
Previous studies find that several bank-specific characteristics affect bank valuations. Although the focus 
of our paper is on the relation between bank size and bank valuation, to remove the effects of other 
characteristics, we control for four characteristics including capital, loans, deposits and asset diversity. 
Following Laeven and Levine (2007), we use four proxies to represent these four characteristics.  
 
First, we use equity divided by assets to control for capital. Better capitalized banks performed better 
during the crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). On the one hand, this could be explained by higher costs of 
taking on risks for banks with higher capital. On the other hand, capital plays an important role on 
absorbing losses. Better capitalized banks are less likely to fail. The positive effects of capital on bank 
valuation illustrate that the equity holders’ investment could reduce the banks’ risk and boost their 
performance.  
 
Second, we use the ratio of net loans to total earning assets to control for loans. Loans, securities and 
investments are included in total earning assets. If the profits of banks generated from loan-making 
activities take a main proportion in the total profits, the values of loans are high. On the other hand, 
banks that specialize in non-lending activities could have low values of loans. Asset securitization has 
pervaded. Some products (e.g., MBS) have been more appealing to banks than loans. Consequently, 
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being used as a “loss leader’’ to increase opportunities of engaging in more lucrative products, loans 
could be a negative earning assets and have negative relation with bank valuation (Calomiris and Nissim 
2014). 
 
Third, we use the ratio of total deposits to total liabilities to control for deposits. Deposits are a kind of 
cheap source of funding for banks, because the interest rates on deposits are usually lower than those 
on borrowed funds. Moreover, Hovakimian and Kane (1990) show that because of deposit insurance, 
banks are able to extract substantial net subsidies. Therefore, banks with high deposits can get more 
low-cost and government-subsidized funding. That is why such banks could have high valuations.  
 
Fourth, we use the difference between one and the ratio of net loans minus other earning assets to total 
earning assets to control for asset diversity (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Securities and investments 
belong to other earning assets. The sum of loans and other earning assets composes of the total earning 
assets. The values of this ratio vary from zero to one. Highly diversified banks engage in both commercial 
banking activities such as lending and investment banking activities such as fee-generating activities. 
Laeven and Levine (2007) find that revenue diversification reduces bank valuation. Goetz et al. (2013) 
find that geographic diversification also reduces bank valuations.  
 
Table 2 lists the definition for each variable.  
 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for all the variables. We winsorize all the variables at the 1% and 99% 
levels to reduce the outliers’ impact. Tobin’s Q has a mean of 1.044, suggesting that the sum of the 
market value of common equity, the book value of preferred shares and the book value of total debt 
exceeds the book value of total asset by 4.4% on average for banks in our sample. Market-to-book ratio 
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has an average of 1.4958, with a standard deviation of 0.7817, which suggests that market-to-book ratio 
varies substantially across banks in our sample. The bank size measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets in thousands at end of each year from 2002 to 2014 has an average of 14.65, higher than the 
average amount calculated by natural logarithm of total operating income in thousands, which is 
11.8487. The ratio of equity to total assets has a mean of 0.09 and a low standard deviation, indicating 
that around 91% of sources of funding come from debt and only 9% come from equity for an average 
bank in our sample. Asset diversity has a mean of 0.4821 but with a high standard deviation, showing 
that banks are well diversified on average but the assets diversity varies. 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of the all the variables. As is shown in the table, both Tobin’s Q 
and market-to-book ratio are highly correlated with log of total assets and log of total operating income. 
That is to say, the correlation between bank size and bank valuation is high regardless of the measures 
of bank size and valuation. Turning to the correlation between bank valuation and control variables, we 
find that Tobin’s Q is not significantly correlated with capital, while the correlation between market-to-
book ratio and capital is significant at the 1% level. Besides, both Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio are 
significantly and negatively correlated with loans and deposit, and significantly and positively correlated 
with asset diversity. 
 
3.3 Empirical model 
We assume that there is a quadric relationship between size and bank valuation, which means that bank 
valuation will increase with the size of a bank first and will decrease when the size is larger than a 
threshold. To examine the relationship between bank valuation and size, we regress bank valuation on 
size as well as the square of bank size. Because we measure bank valuation and size through two 
different ways respectively, we do the linear regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) four times. 
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The models we build are as follow: 
 
(1) 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∗log of total assets𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∗ log of total assets squared𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3∗𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽4∗𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∗𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∗𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(2) 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,t,= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∗log of total operating income𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∗ log of total operating income squared𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽3∗𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∗𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∗𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∗𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(3) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 - 𝑡𝑜 - 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∗log of total assets𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∗ log of total assets squared𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∗𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 
+ 𝛽4∗𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5∗𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∗𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
(4) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 - 𝑡𝑜 - 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∗log of total operating income𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2∗ log of total operating income 
squared𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∗𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4∗𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +𝛽5∗𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6∗𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝜃𝑡 in the model represents year fixed effects, which is used to control for year fixed effects that change 
overtime in these regressions. Adding year fixed effects to our models will make our models more 
reasonable. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Regression results under full sample 
4.1.1 Independent control variables regression results 
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Table 5 presents the regression results between bank size and bank valuation. Column (2) and (4) shows 
the regression results using Tobin’s Q and column (6) and (8) shows the regression results using market-
to-book ratio.  
 
When utilizing Tobin’s Q as a measure of bank valuation, the coefficient on logarithm of total assets is 
positive while the coefficient on its squared term is negative. Both coefficient are significant at the 1% 
level. The results turn out to be the same when using another way to measure bank size, which is 
logarithm of total operating income. When utilizing market-to-book ratio as a replace of Tobin’s Q to 
measure the bank valuation, we find that the coefficient of logarithm of total assets is still positive and 
significant and the coefficient of logarithm of total assets squared is still negative and significant.  
 
The result above is consistent with our expectation that there is a quadric relationship between size and 
bank valuation, and the results are robust to different measures of bank size and bank valuation. Thus, 
we can conclude that bank valuation will first increase and then decrease when bank size increases. 
 
4.1.2 Control variables regression results 
In terms of the control variables, capital is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q. This is 
coincident with the theories we discussed in the previous section. Both loans and asset diversity are 
negatively related to Tobin’s Q. In the meantime, there is a negative relation between loans and asset 
diversity according to table 4. Deposit is positively and significantly related to Tobin’s Q. 
 
Although the relationship between bank size and valuations remains robust regardless of how we 
measure valuations, the relation between capital and bank valuation is not the same using different 
measures. Capital becomes negatively and significantly related to market-to-book ratio. This result 
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shows the importance of using two measures of bank valuations. The relationship between bank 
valuations and other control variables remains the same under different measures. 
 
4.1.3 Compare the results with Laeven and Levine (2007)’s result 
Laeven and Levine (2007) regress Tobin’s Q on asset diversity, and they use bank size, capital, loans, and 
deposits as control variables. Their results show that Tobin’s Q is positively and significantly associated 
with bank size. In contrast, we estimate a quadratic relation between bank size and valuations. As 
regards other control variables, we obtain qualitatively similar results. 
 
4.2 Regression results: time period controls  
4.2.1 Crisis’s impact on relation between bank size and valuation 
We want to test the influence of financial crisis on the relationship between bank valuation and bank 
size and other control variables, and thus we divide our sample into three time periods. Table 6 
illustrates the regression results before the crisis (2002-2006), table 7 shows the regression results 
during the crisis (2007-2009), and table 8 presents the regression results after the crisis (2010-2014). As 
we can see from the tables above, the relationship between bank size and valuations remains robust in 
each sample period, which suggests that financial crisis has no effect on the relation between bank size 
and valuation. 
 
4.2.2 Crisis’s impact on relation between control variables and 
valuation 
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According to table 6, 7, 8, financial crisis has impact on some control variables. When measuring the 
bank valuation using Tobin’s Q, the relationship between deposit and bank valuation was positive and 
significant before the crisis, while it became negative and significant after the crisis. During the crisis, 
there was no significant relation between deposit and bank valuation. A possible reason is as follows. 
Before the crisis, the difference between the interest rates on loans and deposits was high. Hence a 
bank would have higher valuation if it was able to fund a higher portion of its assets with deposits. After 
the crisis, the difference between the interest rates on loans and deposits was very low. Hence having 
more deposits did not result in a higher valuation. 
 
When measuring bank valuation by market-to-book ratio, the relationship between capital and bank 
valuation was negative and significant at the 1% level before the crisis. But the relationship became 
positive and significant during and after the crisis. The relationship between deposits and market-to-
book ratio remained the same under the impact of financial crisis, as did the relation between deposits 
and Tobin’s Q. 
 
Overall, we find that the relationship between control variables and bank valuation are mostly 
significant before the crisis, and the significance of relationship decreased a lot during the crisis. 
However, the significance increased after the crisis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Understanding the relationship between bank size and bank valuation is important, because it can help 
bank managers to decide whether to increase bank size. During the crisis, several large and famous 
banks collapsed, and this phenomenon raised our concerns about the effects of bank size on bank 
valuation. 
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In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between bank size and bank valuation. We also 
examine whether the relationship changed over time. Our assumption is that there is a quadric relation 
between size and bank valuation. We use yearly observations on a large number banks from 2002-2014, 
and regress bank valuations on bank size and its squared term. In order to check the robustness, we use 
two different ways to measure bank size and two different ways to measure bank valuation. We find 
that bank valuations will rise and then fall as bank size increases. This result holds regardless of the 
measures of bank size and valuation, which is consistent with our expectation. We also examine 
whether this quadratic relationship holds before, during and after the crisis, and find that it does. To 
sum up, our result suggests that size is an important determinant of bank valuation, but it is not the 
bigger the better.  
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Table 1: Number of banks in our sample by year 
Year Number of 
Banks 
2002 444 
2003 454 
2004 438 
2005 448 
2006 376 
2007 355 
2008 339 
2009 345 
2010 329 
2011 317 
2012 313 
2013 315 
2014 300 
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Table 2: Variable definitions  
Variable  Definition  
Tobin’s Q  (market value of common equity + the book 
value of preferred shares + the book value of 
total debt) / book value of total assets 
Market-to-book ratio market value of bank’s assets / book value of 
bank’s assets. 
Log of total assets The natural logarithm of total assets in 
thousands at end of each year from 2002 to 
2014.  
Log of total operating income Another way to measure size of the bank. The 
natural logarithm of total operating income in 
thousands during each year from 2002 to 2014. 
Capital  equity / total assets.  
Loans  net loans / total earning assets, where total 
earning assets include net loans, securities, and 
investments.  
Deposits  total deposits / total liabilities.  
Asset diversity  1 – |(net loans – other earning assets)/total 
earning assets|, where other earning assets 
include securities and investments, and total 
earning assets is the sum of net loans and other 
earning assets.  
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Table 3: Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables    
Tobin’s Q 4529 1.0447 0.0688 
Market-to-book ratio 4529 1.4958 0.7817 
    
Independent Variables    
Log of total assets 4529 14.6502 1.6141 
Log of total assets squared 4529 217.2317 51.3228 
Log of total operating income 4529 11.8487 1.6510 
Log of total operating income squared                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             4529 143.1173 43.3819
    
Control Variables    
Capital 4529 0.0947 0.0264 
Loans 4529 0.7429 0.1412 
Deposits 4529 0.8347 0.1183 
Asset diversity 4529 0.4821 0.2247 
 
  
20 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Tobin’s Q  1 .956** .076** .130** .014 -.143** -.101** .084** 
2 
Market-to-book 
ratio 
.956** 1 .067** .110** -.094** -.145** -.090** .099** 
3 Log of total assets .076** .067** 1 .987** .114** -.229** -.421** .083** 
4 
Log of total 
operating income 
.130** .110** .987** 1 .134** -.216** -.467** .048** 
5 Capital  .014 -.094** .114** .134** 1 -.012 .012 -.017 
6 Loans  -.143** -.145** -.229** -.216** -.012 1 .350** -.776** 
7 Deposits  -.101** -.090** -.421** -.467** .012 .350** 1 -.100** 
8 Asset diversity  .084** .099** .083** .048** -.017 -.776** -.100** 1 
Note: ** indicates correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5: Regression results using full sample  
Tobin’s Q market-to-book ratio 
Log of total 
assets 
.092 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.067 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
1.002 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.749 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.003 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
-.002 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.029 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared 
-.025 
*** 
        
Capital .171 
*** 
Capital .150 
*** 
Capital -1.315 
*** 
Capital -1.546 
*** 
Loans -.091 
*** 
Loans -.086 
*** 
Loans -.948 
*** 
Loans -.906 
*** 
Deposits .035 
*** 
Deposits .049 
*** 
Deposits .503 
*** 
Deposits .634 
*** 
Asset 
diversity 
-.038 
*** 
Asset diversity -.034 
*** 
Asset 
diversity 
-.354 
*** 
Asset diversity -.306 
*** 
        
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed effects  Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes 
Observations 4529 Observations 4529 Observations 4529 Observations 4529 
R-squared  .466 R-squared  .471 R-squared  .488 R-squared  .491 
Note: The sample period is from 2002 to 2014. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Regression results using before the crisis sample  
Tobin’s Q market-to-book ratio 
Log of total 
assets 
.081 
*** 
Log of total 
operating income 
.059 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
.904 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.674 
*** 
Log of total 
assets squared 
-.002 
*** 
Log of total 
operating income 
squared                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
-.002 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.025 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared                                                                                                                       
-.021 
*** 
        
Capital .178 
*** 
Capital .149 
*** 
Capital -6.076 
*** 
Capital -6.377 
*** 
Loans -.093 
*** 
Loans -.095 
*** 
Loans -1.113 
*** 
Loans -1.132 
*** 
Deposits .116 
*** 
Deposits .129 
*** 
Deposits 1.262 
*** 
Deposits 1.401 
*** 
Asset diversity -.056 
*** 
Asset diversity -.053 
*** 
Asset 
diversity 
-.665 
*** 
Asset diversity -.630 
*** 
        
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed effects  Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed effects  Yes 
Observations 2148 Observations 2148 Observations 2148 Observations 2148 
R-squared  .207 R-squared  .219 R-squared  .222 R-squared  0.234 
Note: The sample period is from 2002 to 2006. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Regression results using during the crisis sample  
Tobin’s Q market-to-book ratio 
Log of total 
assets 
.077 
*** 
Log of total 
operating income 
.067 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
.771 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.652 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.002 
*** 
Log of total 
operating income 
squared                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
-.002 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.023 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared                                                                                                                         
-.023 
*** 
        
Capital .088 Capital .073 Capital 1.311 
** 
Capital 1.159 
* 
Loans -.145 
*** 
Loans -.142 
*** 
Loans -1.418 
*** 
Loans -1.389 
*** 
Deposits -.022 Deposits -.010 Deposits .204 Deposits .306 
Asset 
diversity 
-.018 Asset diversity -.016 Asset 
diversity 
-.076 Asset diversity -.050 
        
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed effects  Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes 
Observations 1039 Observations 1039 Observations 1039 Observations 1039 
R-squared  .218 R-squared  .222 R-squared  .230 R-squared  .235 
Note: The sample period is from 2007 to 2009. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: Regression results using after the crisis sample  
Tobin’s Q market-to-book ratio 
Log of total 
assets 
.136 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.093 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
1.324 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income 
.905 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.004 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
-.003 
*** 
Log of total 
assets 
squared 
-.039 
*** 
Log of total 
operating 
income squared                                                                                                                                                                                                         
-.032 
*** 
        
Capital .116 
** 
Capital .119 Capital 1.211 
** 
Capital 1.240 
** 
Loans -.068 
*** 
Loans -.054 
*** 
Loans -.612 
*** 
Loans -.496 
*** 
Deposits -.068 
*** 
Deposits -.055 
*** 
Deposits -.448 
*** 
Deposits -.351 
** 
Asset 
diversity 
-.022 
** 
Asset diversity -.015 Asset 
diversity 
-.147 Asset diversity -.086 
        
Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes Year fixed 
effects  
Yes 
Observations 1342 Observations 1342 Observations 1342 Observations 1342 
R-squared  .284 R-squared  .266 R-squared  .279 R-squared  .261 
Note: The sample period is from 2010 to 2014. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
